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Abstract—Due to increase in threats posed by offshore 
foundries, the companies outsourcing IPs are forced to protect 
their designs from the threats posed by the foundries. Few of the 
threats are IP piracy, counterfeiting and reverse engineering. To 
overcome these, logic encryption has been observed to be a 
leading countermeasure against the threats faced. It introduces 
extra gates in the design, known as key gates which hide the 
functionality of the design unless correct keys are fed to them.  
The scan tests are used by various designs to observe the fault 
coverage. These scan chains can become vulnerable to side-
channel attacks. The potential solution for protection of this 
vulnerability is obfuscation of the scan output of the scan chain. 
This involves shuffling the working of the cells in the scan chain 
when incorrect test key is fed. In this paper, we propose a method 
to overcome the threats posed to scan design as well as the logic 
circuit. The efficiency of the secured design is verified on 
ISCAS’89 circuits and the results prove the security of the 
proposed method against the threats posed. 
 
Keywords—Hardware Security, Obfuscation, Logic 
Encryption, Scan-Chain 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE capital costs and maintenance costs for a 
semiconductor foundry have forced the companies to 
outsource the fabrication to offshore foundries. This leads to 
concerns of many untrusted parties within the foundries getting 
access to the Intellectual Property (IP). These parties can pirate 
the IP, reverse engineer to obtain the netlist, modify the 
integrated chip (IC) to insert malicious circuitry in the form of 
Hardware Trojans (HT). ICs can also be overproduced and 
sold illegally. The semiconductor industry faces heavy losses 
as a result of these malpractices that occur in the foundries. As 
a result, protecting the design of the IP has become a top 
priority for the companies that outsource the designs to 
foundries. 
One way of protection of the IPs is through logic encryption of 
the circuit. In these encrypted circuits, only when the correct 
key vector is given the output of the circuit will operate 
correctly. Whenever the key vector is incorrect, the output will 
not match with the circuit’s functionality. In logic encryption, 
the functionality of the circuit is hidden by insertion of key 
gates. Most of the logic encryption methods use insertion of 
XOR/XNOR gates at the locations. These key gates can be 
either inserted randomly [1] or inserted selectively at specific 
locations of the circuit. The determination of selective 
insertion key gate locations requires an algorithm [2]. This 
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algorithm identifies the key gate locations. [3] Mentions all the 
logic encryption techniques that have been suggested and 
evaluates the advantages of each encryption. It also analyzes 
the vulnerabilities of each logic encryption technique and how 
it is overcome by the subsequent techniques. The circuit is 
encrypted first and then sent to for manufacturing to the 
foundry. After it has been manufactured, the designer acquires 
the IC and unlocks the chip by giving the keys correctly. 
However, these methods are not fully compliant since each key 
bit can be sensitized to the output of the circuit and the correct 
test key can be obtained. This vulnerability is overcome 
through an algorithm wherein all the key bits are made 
dependent on each other. In that way, sensitization of each bit 
to the output of the circuit is not possible since by changing 
one key bit, multiple key bits will get affected. 
The other way is through protection by scan design. It was 
observed during encryption process, the intermediate states can 
be observed at the output of the scan chain. Hence based on 
this, the attacker can narrow down on the cipher key. Some 
countermeasures include clearing all the data in the system 
whenever a switching of the mode from normal to test is 
suggested [4]. In the method proposed in [5], where Mirror 
Key Registers are used for isolating the cipher key whenever 
there is an insecure operation. The main drawback of the 
scheme is that it was not feasible to do online testing. Later 
countermeasures included re-ordering of the scan cells in order 
to prevent the observation of the correct states by the attacker. 
However, scan based attacks are independent of the sequence 
of the scan cells; rather they depend on accessibility to the 
states of scan chain. Hence, these methods are not resilient 
against the signature attacks since signature attacks do not 
depend on the ordering of the scan cells. Hence the main 
objective is to obfuscate the scan data such that the states are 
not accessible to the attacker. In the scan data obfuscation 
proposed in [6], a shift register (SR) sequence is integrated 
with the scan chain of the CUT. This SR will control the value 
of the Test Control (TC) bit of the scan flip-flop (SFF). The 
test data can be scanned through only when the test key is 
correctly entered. This method obfuscates the scan cells as 
well as the data which is available at the scan output and 
overcomes the vulnerabilities of the previously mentioned key 
and lock methods. This method is however vulnerable to the 
Test-Mode-Only-Signature-Attack (TMOSA) [6]. This is 
overcome by dynamically obfuscating the data coming from 
the scan chain. 
 This paper discusses the method where scan data is obfuscated 
dynamically and the key dependent logic encryption of the 
CUT. A new method is proposed where in the dynamic 
obfuscation is done to the scan data of the CUT and the key 
interdependency block is integrated with the CUT. The 
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proposed methodology protects the CUT from both the side-
channel attacks as well as the attacks on the CUT to get the 
correct test key. The functionality of the CUT matches the 
expected functionality when the correct test key is entered at 
the scan chain and at the CUT side. In case of bit mismatch of 
the test key in either of the security modules, the functionality 
of the circuit changes and the output does not match with the 
ideal output. The proposed method obfuscates scan chain of 
the circuit from the side channel attacks and from the attacks 
on the circuit. The scan chain of the circuit is secure through 
the dynamic obfuscation. The functionality of the circuit is 
secure through the key interdependency block from which the 
key bits are fed to the key gates. 
In this paper, Section II summarizes the evolution of scan 
based attacks and logic encryption. In Section III the proposed 
methodology is described for protection of sensitive data in the 
circuit and Section IV analyzes the proposed approach and 
section V concludes the work. 
II. RELATED WORKS AND MOTIVATION 
A. Evolution of scan based attacks 
The data that is generated, processed or stored in the chip can 
be taken from the chip without breaking into the chip. This is 
done through side-channel attacks. The scan chains are 
designed for access of the Circuit-Under-Test (CUT) through 
test access ports. The scan based attacks involve breaking into 
the chip and getting the information about the data that is 
going into the CUT and the data that is coming out form the 
CUT. This data can used to deduce the key of the chip. The 
scan-based attacks were first proposed as two-phase attack on 
DES in [4]. An input register Flip-Flop (FF) is chosen in the 
first phase and its location in the scan chain is obtained. This is 
done by scanning the responses keeping the scan chain in the 
test mode and comparing them to the plaintext pairs that are 
fed in normal mode, having one bit difference loaded. This 
procedure can also be executed on the AES chip [5]. In [7], the 
detection of combinational Trojans in the circuit which can be 
inserted based on different parameters. The parameter 
considered in this work is side channel parameter of leakage 
power. Whenever the leakage power is above a threshold value 
at a certain net, the corresponding net is checked for additional 
combinational circuit through which Trojan can be inserted. 
However in these attacks, it is assumed that only cryptographic 
operations are performed by the registers. Also, it is assumed 
that the scan design consists of registers alone. There can be a 
mismatch in practical scenarios. This was proved in [8] where 
the practical scenarios were chosen. The success of these 
attack scenarios did not depend on the moment at which the 
scan chain captured the encryption result. The keys can be 
analyzed for their correctness by observing the output response 
through the scan design for each segment of encryption. The 
correct key is found for all segments through this process and 
later it is combined to obtain the cipher key. In [9], the 
countermeasure followed was whenever there was a mode-
switching in the CUT, sensitive information in the scan chain 
would be erased. It was proposed to carry out the attacks only 
in test mode in order to overcome the countermeasure in [9]. 
Initially, the scan cells are in test mode and are fed with a 
known plaintext. When the capture phase occurs, it is 
encrypted and the result after encryption is obtained through 
the scan chain. This type of attack does not require switching 
back of the scan cells to the normal working mode for 
obtaining the encrypted result. 
One of the countermeasures suggested is blocking of cipher 
key. In this suggested method, whenever there is an insecure 
operation, sensitive information is prevented from being 
leaked by isolating the key from the module. The key can be 
accessed at any given time by switching into regular working 
mode. However when the design is in the blocked mode, the 
key is not accessible. From the test mode, only possible mode 
transfer is to secure mode. This implies that when the design is 
in secure mode, it cannot go back to the test mode unless the 
circuit is reset. When circuit is reset, all the intermediate data 
in the scan chain gets cleared thereby preventing any leak of 
data that was observed when it was in test mode. 
The next countermeasure suggested was obfuscation of scan 
output. The normal SFFs were replaced by state dependent 
scan flip-flop (SDSFF) in [10]. The SDSFFs can have output 
either as its historical state value or as current output response 
obtained from CUT. Thus, when an incorrect key is entered, 
few of the SDSFFs will output the current response of CUT 
while remaining SDSFFs will output a historical value. Later, 
it was observed that the order of the sub-chains of a scan chain 
could be reordered. This was done through a test security 
controller (TSC) and a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). 
The LFSR will get correctly seeded only when the test key 
entered and the secure register key match. Only after this, the 
secure mode testing can be performed with known sub-chain 
order. If invalid test key is fed, the test data scanned out will 
contain responses that are deceptive. However, it was later 
proven that the side-channel attacks as well as signature 
attacks do not depend on the order of the scan-chain. Hence, 
scan-based attacks can be successful even when the scan-chain 
is static obfuscated. 
B. Evolution of Logic Encryption 
The first of the methods proposed to overcome IP piracy issues 
were encryption using gates. This type of logic encryption is 
carried out by randomly inserting key gates into the design. 
The key gates are a combination of AND/OR or XOR/XNOR 
[2], [3] or multiplexers (MUX) [11], look Up Tables (LUT). In 
encryption using gates, one input of the key gate is connected 
to any net inside the circuit and the other input is the key input. 
When the correct key input is given then the functionality of 
the circuit is correct, else the outputs are corrupted.  
In encryption using MUX [12], MUXes inserted are of size 
2x1. One input of the MUX is correct value; other input is 
taken from any net in the circuit. The select bit of the MUX is 
the key bit. MUX based encryption can also be carried out by 
using an Obfuscation Cell (OC) [13]. An obfuscation cell is a 
combination of MUX and an inverter. In both the methods, the 
select line of the MUX acts is the key bit. For correct key 
input, the circuit gives the correct behavior, whereas if 
incorrect key bit is given then output obtained mismatches 
from ideal output. In these methods, each key bit could be 
sensitized to the output of the circuit and the information 
regarding the design could be obtained. These encryption 
techniques were thus proven to be susceptible to path 
sensitization attacks.  
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For circuits with sequential elements, encryption using FSMs 
was proposed. In this method, the state transition graph of the 
finite state machine is modified such that if an incorrect input 
sequence is given then the FSM goes into a state from which it 
will never get out. These states are called black states. Only 
when a correct input sequence is given to the FSM, correct 
functionality of the encrypted circuit can be observed. It was 
later observed that if all the states in FSM are not defined, then 
attacker could get the details of the chip by transitioning 
through these states. 
This led to encryption of the circuits through evaluation of 
parameter. In [11], a parameter called fault impact is calculated 
for each net in the circuit. The parameter is a measure for the 
insertion of the key gate in the circuit. The key gate is inserted 
at the net which has highest fault impact. The fault impact is 
calculated through the following formula: 
Fault Impact = 𝑁0𝑃0×𝑁0𝑂0 + 𝑁0𝑃1× 𝑁0𝑂1          (1) 
Where, 𝑁0𝑃0 is number of patterns that detect s-a-0 fault at a 
given net, 
𝑁0𝑂0is number of output bits that are corrupted for a given s-a-
0 fault, 
𝑁0𝑃1 is number of patterns that detect s-a-1 fault at a given net, 
𝑁0𝑂1 is number of output bits that are corrupted for a given s-
a-1 fault. 
This technique is observed to be susceptible to various attacks 
such as logic cone analysis based attack, hill-climbing, path 
sensitization and SAT-based attacks. The major drawback of 
the methods is that the key value could be sensitized to the 
output of the circuit. To overcome this, the method of strong 
logic locking [12] is proposed where in the key gates are 
inserted in the circuit such that if any key has to be sensitized 
to the output, it cannot be done unless all the other key bits are 
also controlled at some values i.e. all key gates interfere with 
each other at some location in the circuit. It was observed that 
this method offered only limited number of key gate positions 
for a design with a certain number of keys i.e. the number of 
key gate locations did not match with the number of keys 
required for encrypting the circuit. 
Thus, it could be observed that the key bits cannot be directly 
placed at the key gate locations of the circuit. In [14], method 
of passing the key values through a block in which all the key 
bits are correlated is discussed. The value of each output key 
bit of this block is dependent on multiple inputs. The Primary 
Key (PK) bits are input to this block. In this block, an 
algorithm is used such that all the PKs are interlinked with 
each other. The Secondary Key (SK) bits are the output of this 
block. Each SK bit is related to many PK bits. Hence if any 
one of the PKs is changed, more than one number of SK bits 
will change.  
This method could easily overcome the drawbacks faced by 
the countermeasures listed previously to this. It can be 
observed that by obfuscating the scan output of the scan chain 
and by inserting the key interdependency for the circuit, the 
security for the circuit cannot be breached.  
Table I summarizes the different approaches to counter the 
scan chain attacks and the logic encryption attacks and their 
vulnerabilities. 
 
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
The proposed methodology consists of 4 steps. First, the scan 
chain integration is done. This involves connection of SFFs to 
the inputs of the CUT. The mode of operation of each MUX in 
the SFF depends on the TC bit. Next, the scan chain is 
dynamically obfuscated by selecting a few scan cells out of the 
scan chain. The test control bit of these scan cells is denoted by 
tc. The value of tc depends on the test key bit which will be fed 
to the shift register (SR) of the dynamic obfuscation logic. 
Next, the test key loading controller is designed. The test key 
loading controller will determine the time period for which the 
obfuscated scan cells will remain in test mode. During this 
time, the test key is fed through the SR. The time for which the 
cells will remain in test mode will depend on the number of 
FFs in the SR. Finally, the key interdependency block is 
integrated with the CUT. The nodes for insertion of key gates 
are determined through fault analysis based logic encryption 
algorithm. The primary keys for the CUT are passed through 
TABLE I  
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the key interdependency block and the outputs key bits of the 
block are one of the inputs to the key gates of the CUT. 
 
Fig.1. Flowchart for the proposed methodology 
A.  Scan Chain Integration 
The scan chain is present in the periphery of the circuit. The 
scan chain consists of Scan Flip-Flops (SFF) that is connected 
together. Each SFF consists of a 2x1 MUX connected at the 
input of a normal FF. The test control (TC) signal is the select 
line to the 2x1 MUX of each SFF. The TC signal is used to 
control the switching of the CUT from functional mode to test 
mode of operation. When TC=0, the CUT is in test mode. 
When TC is 0, the data is serially fed to the circuit through the 
scan chain. Then, TC is made high to switch the CUT to 
functional mode. 
 
Fig. 2 Scan Chain 
 
In this mode, the output response of the circuit is captured by 
the SFF present in the scan chain. When, the TC is switched 
back to 0 after one cycle, the captured output response is 
shifted through the scan chain to the scan out (SO). 
Simultaneously, next test input is fed through the scan chain. 
Figure 2 describes the structure of the scan chain. It can be 
observed that the data which will be fed to the subsequent FFs 
depends on the TC value entirely. 
B.  Dynamic Obfuscation of the Scan Chain 
The next step is to obfuscate the scan chain of the design. The 
method followed here is dynamic obfuscation. This method 
involves obfuscation of the data that will be either fed into or 
read from the circuit. The Test Control (TC) to the SFF is 
controlled through the obfuscation technique. 
 
Fig. 3. Dynamic Obfuscation of Scan Cells [6] 
 
Figure 3 describes the dynamic obfuscation scheme followed 
for obfuscation of data in the scan cells. The test control (tc) 
for selected number of SFFs from the scan chain is controlled 
by shift registers (SR) and OR gate. Consider M SFFs for the 
circuit. N SFFs are arbitrarily chosen for dynamic obfuscation. 
The SR contains N DFFs that are connected serially with 2x1 
MUX at the beginning. The output of the last FF is one of the 
inputs of the MUX, the other input being the test key which 
has to be loaded. 
The tc for these N SFFs is given through the output of OR 
gate. The two inputs of the OR gate are system TC and either 
of Q or Q` from their paired FF in SR. The choice of Q or Q` 
depends on the test key that is scanned into the SR. If the 
correct key is scanned, then during the test mode, the Q or Q` 
selection matches with the key and tc becomes 0. If wrong key 
is scanned, then tc becomes 1 and hence the SFF does not 
work in test mode and the output gets corrupted. The Q or Q` 
of the FFs in SR are also connected to an OR gate that is 
outside the SR. The output of this OR gate is connected to 
another DFF, whose output is a mismatch signal. This DFF is 
triggered during negative edge transition of the load SR signal 
LD_SR.  
It can be seen that during the test mode, LD_SR should be high 
so that new data is loaded through the SR. When incorrect key 
is entered, since the DFFs of SR are connected in circular 
form, the key will be circularly shifted. This changes the tc bit 
of the scan cells that are dynamically obfuscated and the 
wrong test key will be cyclically shifted in each cycle until a 
new test key is fed through the SR. 
C. Test key loading controller logic 
The test key loading controller forms an important part of the 
dynamic obfuscation logic of the scan chain. 




Fig. 4. Test key loading Controller [6] 
 
This controller generates the output LD_SR for a time equal to 
the time required for loading the test key into the circuit.  The 
test key loading controller schematic is shown in figure 4. It 
consists of q-bit and 2-bit counter. The value of q is 
determined by the number of SFFs that are selected for 
dynamic obfuscation. It is given by the expression q=log2N. 
Both the counters are negative level triggered as shown in 
figure 4. When system RST is high, both counters’ output is 
cleared to 0. The 2-bit counter will be enabled (and ON) only 
when system TC is high. Similarly, the q-bit counter will be 
disabled as long as q_en is low.  
When TC becomes 1, the 2-bit counter starts to count. When 
the count reaches 10, q_en becomes 1 enabling the q-bit 
counter. Simultaneously, the enable signal for 2-bit counter 
becomes 1 and hence the 2-bit counter stops counting. Also, 
the CLR signal for the q-bit counter should become 0. Hence, 
TC is made 0 for the q-bit counter to get enabled and to ensure 
that key can be loaded into SR only during the switching of the 
circuit from functional mode to test mode.  
Then, the q-bit counter counts for N clock cycles. The output 
LD_SR is high during this period. Hence, the test key is 
scanned through the SI port of the MUX into the SR. When the 
counter reaches N that is when the test key has been loaded, 
the clr_en becomes high, thus enabling the CLR signal of the 
2-bit counter. As a result, the q_en bit goes low; disabling the 
q-bit counter and simultaneously LD_SR also becomes low. 
Also, the enable signal for the q-bit counter goes high stopping 
the count.  
D.  Obfuscating circuit with key interdependency block 
Next, the key interdependency block for the circuit is designed. 
The key interdependency block is integrated with the circuit in 
accordance with figure5. An external key block is designed; 
whose outputs are the key bits to the remaining SFFs of the 
scan chain. The Primary Key (PK) bits are input to this block. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Key Interdependency Block 
 
In this block, an algorithm is used such that all the PKs are 
interlinked with each other. The key dependency block in 
figure 5 shown follows an algorithm in calculating the value of  
the output of the block. The Secondary Key (SK) bits are the 
output of this block. Each SK bit is related to many PK bits. 
The key bits in this case cannot be determined easily through 
algorithms such as path sensitization. The algorithm1 describes 
the key interdependency block procedure. The second input of 
the ith gate in jth stage is the output of the ((i − (2j − 1) + N) 
%N) th gate in the (j-1) th stage. 
The output of this block is fed as key inputs to the gates. 
Whenever there is an incorrect PK bit, the number of key bits 
that will get affected in SK bits is more than one. To obtain a 
correct SK bit, multiple PK bits should be correct, since one 
SK bit depends on multiple PK bits.  
As all of these primary key inputs are interlinked, there is more 
than one key-gate dependent on a single primary input. When 
one primary key input bit is changed, it affects all these key-
gates. 
 
Algorithm1.  Generate key interdependency block 
 
Input: Number of keys (K), Primary key values (PK). 
Output: Secondary key (SK)  
1. Read the number of keys and the values in PK. 
2. for each stage (in s) do 
3.          for all values of K do 
4.            compute the 2nd input to be given to the 
gate  
5.            if first stage 
6.              two inputs are Kth value of PK and 
computed value 
7.            else 
8.              the inputs are Kth value in (s-1)th stage 
and computed value in (s-1)th stage   
9.          end for  
10. end for     
 
Let us consider the example a circuit with 5 inputs and 2 
outputs. The key gate location in the circuit is determined 
through fault impact parameter. The fault impact metric is 
computed for a set of randomized input patterns of the circuit. 
The expression is given by eq. (1). The key gate locations are 
identified and XOR gates are placed at these nets. To further 
strengthen the encryption, some of the XOR gates at the key 
locations are replaced by XNOR and an inverter. The circuit 
will give the correct output only for a particular key pattern. 
For the other patterns, one or more bits of the output will be 
corrupted. This algorithm will encrypt the circuit. For key size 
of 4, if the primary key (PK) varies from the correct PK by 
1bit, then the number of changes in secondary key (SK) is 
more than one since through the key dependency block, a 
primary key will drive multiple secondary keys. As a result, 
TABLE II 












 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 3 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
 5 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 6 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
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the input to a key gate in the circuit is dependent on multiple 
primary keys that are fed to the block. Next the scan chain of 
the circuit is obfuscated. This is done through dynamic 
obfuscation. 
In the obfuscation of the scan chain, N blocking scan cells are 
to be paired with N DFFs of the shift register (SR). These N 
scan cells are selected by non-repetitive sequence P. Each 
element in the sequence P can vary from 1 to length of the scan 
chain (L).  
The second sequence (T) determines which output of the DFF 
in the SR should be used for the obfuscation scheme of the 
scan data. Each element in T can have either 0 or 1. If the 
element in T has a value 1, then Q` in the DFF of SR is 
connected to the OR gate, else Q is used for obfuscation of 
scan data. 
In the circuit, consider N=3, P= {1, 3, 5} and T= {0, 1, 1}. 
This implies that in the scan chain, the first, third and fifth scan 
flip-flops (SFFs) are chosen for the obfuscation scheme. The 
mode of operation of these SFFs is controlled by OR operation 
of TC and output of the DFF in SR. The sequence T implies 
that for first SFF, the OR gate will have inputs as TC and Q` of 
DFF1 in SR. Similarly for third and fifth SFFs, the inputs to 
the OR gate will be TC and Q of DFF2 and DFF3 in SR 
respectively. 
Table II shows a scenario where the wrong test key is scanned 
and hence as subsequent key bits are fed through SI signal, the 
mismatch signal goes high indicating that the SI which is fed 
to the SR is not same as the sequence T. For this set of 
obfuscation parameters, the scan chain will propagate the 
correct input/output values only when the scan input (SI) of the 
circuit is 011, that is, when both SI and T match.  
In the test mode, the third SFF will fetch the value from CUT 
instead of shifting the value from first SFF and hence there 
will be mismatch in outputs of obfuscated scheme circuit and 
the circuit without any encryption. When SI is 010, the least 
significant bit is loaded into the SR in the first cycle. Since 
mismatch signal goes high, the sequence loaded in SR will 
shift circularly 001 after the first cycle. In the second cycle, 
since tc port is one for second SFF, it fetches an unknown 
value x0 from CUT instead of fetching from the previous SFF. 
This process continues till MSB of the SI is fed to the SR. 
Hence, the test vector applied will be a combination of 
unknown states from the CUT as well as bits from SI whereas 
the original test vector should have been 010. The values of 
these unknown states keep changing as internal states of SR 
keep changing every cycle. From the table II, it can also be 
seen that since the wrong value of SI is scanned into the scan 
chain, the mismatch signal remains high always and even 
though the SFF is in test mode (TC=0), the modes of one or 
more of the SFFs which are dynamically obfuscated change to 
1, causing them to take fetch the data from the CUT instead of 
fetching from the previous SFF. This will result in corrupted 
output. The design does not work until both T and SI vectors 
have the same value. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The proposed method is evaluated on ISCAS’89 circuits. First, 
the net list has to be obtained for the CUT. For this, 
randomized set of 1000 patterns are fed to the CUT and the 
fault list is analyzed. This is done using the HOPE tool 
simulator. The fault impact of each net is obtained by running 
a python script on the fault list obtained through the HOPE 
simulator. The key gate locations are obtained and key gates 
are inserted. The key dependency block is now attached to the 
circuit and the inputs of key gates in the circuit are the outputs 
of the key dependency block. The scan design is then 
integrated with the circuit to obtain the overall design.  
For the dynamic obfuscation scheme, the probability of 
obtaining the correct test key pattern for N-bit test key is 1/2N . 
However, when the obfuscation is decoded, one trivial test key 
which the attacker will try can be test key sequence T in itself. 
Once the attacker feeds the scan input key to have same value 
as the test key sequence T, then the scan design is unlocked. In 
order to overcome this, the key dependency block which is 
integrated with the CUT can provide additional encryption to 
the design. Even when the attacker has decoded the scan 
design, the key interdependency algorithm will still encrypt the 
circuit. The attacker will have to enter the correct primary keys 
in order to obtain the correct secondary keys only after which 
the circuit will give correct outputs. In the key dependency 
scheme, when hill climbing attacks are performed, by flipping 
a key bit in primary side, number of secondary bits which will 
get affected is at least 20%. Flipping one primary key bit 
affects multiple secondary bits; hence the convergence towards 
the correct key is not possible in this attack.  
Also, the hamming distance increases as the number of key 
bits which are incorrect increase. Hence the probability of 
obtaining the correct key with respect to the key 
interdependency block is very less since the output key bit 
does not depend on a single input key bit of the block. It 
depends on multiple primary keys. Hence, the probability of 
obtaining the correct primary key bits for the key 
interdependency block for N bit key pattern is 1/2N . The 
probability of the obtaining correct set of keys for the circuit 
obfuscated under the proposed method is further less than that 
of individual schemes. 
Table III shows the probabilities of obtaining the test key in 
each scheme and for the proposed scheme. It can be seen that 
as the number of key bits increases, it is more difficult to guess 
the correct key bits for the circuit. The probability of obtaining 
the key bit for the proposed scheme is equal to square of the 
probability of obtaining the correct key for the individual 
schemes. The attacker will require more time to decode the 
correct bit key sequence since the correct test key has to be 
given to both the scan chain and the CUT in order to have 
correct functionality of the circuit. Hence, the proposed 
scheme thwarts the brute force attacks on the CUT. 
Whenever incorrect scan design test key is given in 
test/functional mode, the corresponding SFF switches to 
TABLE III  
COMPARISON OF PROBABILITIES OF OBTAINING THE CORRECT KEY FOR EACH 
SCHEME 
Key Bits Dynamic 
Obfuscation 
Key Interdependency Proposed Scheme 
4 0.0625 0.0625 0.0039 
8 0.0039 0.0039 ~10-5 
16 1.5258E-5 1.5258E-5 2.328E-10 
32 2.328E-10 2.328E-10 5.421E-20 
64 5.421E-20 5.421E-20 2.9387E-39 
128 2.9387E-39 2.9387E-39 8.6361E-78 
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functional/test mode respectively and hence the output from 
the scan chain does not match with the ideal output of the 
circuit. The number of incorrect input bits will be from the 
SFF which is connected to the incorrect scan design test key 
bit till the length of the SFF chain. Hence, incorrect inputs are 
fed to the CUT and the output bits are corrupted.  
Also, whenever the primary keys to the key dependency block 
are incorrect, then there is high corruption observed in the 
output bits. The hamming distance is observed to be high as 
the number of incorrect key bits to the dependency block 
increases. Through the key dependency block, the output 
corruption is more as compared to the output corruption 
observed in conventional logic encryption method. The 
conventional encryption method is same as the key 
dependency block based encryption method except that the key 
dependency block is absent in the conventional logic 
encryption method. As a result, the hamming distance in key 
dependency block based encryption is more compared to the 
conventional encryption for same sequence of incorrect key 
bits. In our proposed scheme, the hamming distance will 
depend on both the scan test key and the primary test key. 
Therefore, the percentage of output corruption is more in the 
proposed scheme than compared to the individual schemes of 
encryption due to increase in hamming distance. 
 
Fig. 6. Percentage output corruption Vs percentage of wrong key bits for 
different key-bit lengths 
 
Figure 6 shows the variation of observed output from the ideal 
output as a measure of percentage of wrong key bits fed to the 
design for s1423 with key interdependency block added. It can 
be seen that as the percentage of wrong keys increases, the 
percentage of output bits that are corrupted also increase. This 
can be observed as the key size increases. The percentage 
change in output corruption is non-linear due to the high 
correlation that is present between the key bits of the key 
interdependency block. Due to this, the correct key cannot be 
obtained by flipping each key bit in successive attempts. 
Hence, the proposed method is robust against hill climbing 
attack wherein the attacker flips the each key bit in order to 
reduce the hamming distance between the correct key and the 
input key. 
Figure 7 shows comparison of percentage of output corruption 
that is observed when wrong key bits are fed with and without 
the key interdependency block to the CUT for s1423 having 
128 bit encryption. It can be observed that when the key 
interdependency block is introduced, then the output 
corruption is more than 20% but without the key 
interdependency block, the percentage is less than 20% only 
(15%). Hence, the output corruption, thereby the hamming 
distance also increases when key interdependency block is 
introduced in the design. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Percentage output corruption Vs percentage of wrong key bits, with and 
without key interdependency block 
 
The scan design method proposed by the other secure scan 
design methodologies has vulnerabilities such as in MKR [5], 
online testing is inhibited. In countermeasure based on mode-
reset scenarios [9], if the attack is executed in test-mode only, 
then the mode-reset countermeasure fails. Also, the SDSFF 
used in [10] to overcome the test-mode only attacks fails when 
a fault occurs in the CUT. The proposed methodology for scan 
design approach overcomes these drawbacks faced by the 
other scan designs and is the resilient one in one or more figure 
of merit without any compromise in testability of the scan 
design. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this work, the obfuscation of scan design and the key 
interdependency based logic encryption methods is analyzed 
and a combined approach is proposed to ensure that CUT is 
secure against side channel attacks as well as attacks on the 
CUT such as IP piracy, counterfeiting and over production. 
 
In the proposed scheme, the probability that an adversary 
guesses the correct test key for both scan design and the key 
interdependency block is measured. This probability of 
guessing is very small since the correct test key must be 
entered at both the scan side and the logic encryption side to 
ensure that the functionality of the CUT is correct. Thus, this 
secure design prevents the attacker from getting any 
information of the design under test (CUT). 
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